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WOULD MANDATING BROADBAND 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY HELP OR HURT 
COMPETITION?   
A COMMENT ON THE END-TO-END 
DEBATE 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO* 
ABSTRACT 
A chorus of commentators has drawn inspiration from the ‘‘end-to-
end’’ argument first advanced by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark and called 
upon policy makers to mandate that last-mile broadband providers 
adhere to certain principles of network neutrality.  In his contribution to 
this symposium, Professor Christopher Yoo offers an economic critique 
of these proposals.  He first concludes that they are based on a 
misreading of Saltzer, Reed, and Clark, who implicitly reject turning the 
end-to-end argument into a categorical mandate.  In addition, 
prohibiting the use of proprietary protocols can harm consumers by 
skewing the Internet towards certain types of applications.  Finally, 
network neutrality raises the even more significant danger of forestalling 
the emergence of new broadband technologies by reinforcing the existing 
supply-side and demand-side economies of scale and by stifling 
incentives to invest in alternative network platforms.  Although such 
considerations would be problematic under any circumstances, they carry 
particular weight with respect to industries such as broadband, which are 
undergoing rapid technological change. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.  Thanks to the participants on the 
panel on Broadband Policy at the Conference on ‘‘The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward 
a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age’’ sponsored by the Silicon Flatirons 
Telecommunications Program at the University of Colorado and to Douglas Galbi, Richard 
Nagareda, Bob Rasmussen, Doug Sicker, Jim Speta, Phil Weiser, and Tim Wu for their input 
on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The broadband industry has reached a crossroads.  After avoiding 
the issue for years,1 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has opened two comprehensive proceedings designed to resolve how the 
major broadband technologies should be regulated.2  Congressional 
committees have also conducted hearings exploring many of the same 
issues.3  At the same time, a chorus of commentators, led by Stanford law 
professor and Internet guru Lawrence Lessig, has invoked the ‘‘end-to-
end argument’’ first advanced by Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David 
Clark in 19814 and has called upon the FCC to require that all 
broadband network owners adhere to certain principles of open access 
and network neutrality.5  At their core, network neutrality proposals stem 
 
 1. The FCC’s reluctance to address these issues may end up limiting its latitude in 
determining how broadband should be regulated.  When the Ninth Circuit first confronted 
the proper regulatory classification of cable modem services in AT&T Corp. v. City of 
Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), the FCC had not yet addressed the issue, see id. at 
876, which forced the court to resolve the issue for itself by concluding that cable modem 
service is a ‘‘telecommunications service.’’  Even though the FCC has since concluded that 
cable modem service is more properly regarded as an ‘‘information service,’’ the Ninth Circuit 
has declined to accord Chevron deference to the FCC’s rulings on the grounds that it is bound 
by stare decisis to adhere to its initial determination.  See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).  This appears inconsistent with Chevron’s recognition that agency 
interpretations of statutes should be permitted to change over time.  See Chevron USA Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1986).  For an interesting discussion of the 
relationship between Chevron and stare decisis, see Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling 
Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997). 
 2. One docket addresses the regulatory regime to be applied to digital subscriber line 
(DSL) service.  See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline 
Modem NPRM].  The other docket focuses on cable modem services.  See Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable 
Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM]; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287 (2000) 
[hereinafter Cable Modem NOI]. 
 3. See The Government’s Role in Promoting the Future of the Telecommunications 
Industry and Broadband Deployment: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). 
 4. See J. H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277 (1984) (revised version of paper first presented in 
1981). 
 5. Lessig offered his most complete statements of this position in LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 34-48, 147-75 (2001); and Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, 
The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).  For other leading commentaries offering related proposals, see 
Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 677 (2001); Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and 
Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 
(2000); William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the 
Principle of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment 
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from the concern that network owners will use their control over last-
mile broadband technologies to discriminate against nonproprietary 
Internet service providers (ISPs) and unaffiliated content and 
applications.  According to these advocates, mandating open access 
interoperability is essential if the environment for competition and 
innovation on the Internet is to be preserved. 
There can be no question that the widespread acceptance of the 
end-to-end argument has played a key role in fostering the Internet’s 
meteoric success and remains a central tenet guiding decisions with 
respect to network design.  That said, the academic debates and the 
arguments currently being advanced before the FCC have largely 
overlooked the fact that there is a crucial difference between embracing 
the end-to-end argument as a design principle and elevating it into a 
regulatory mandate.  While adherence to the end-to-end argument may 
make sense in most cases, circumstances do exist in which mandating 
network neutrality would actually harm competition. 
In this article, I develop three fundamental propositions that shed 
new light on the end-to-end debate.  The first is that the leading 
network neutrality proposals are actually inconsistent with the end-to-
end argument advanced by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark.  A close reading of 
their seminal works supports applying the end-to-end argument on a 
case-by-case basis rather than in the categorical manner envisioned by 
the current proposals pending before the FCC, a conclusion confirmed 
by subsequent technologists. 
Second, I show how network neutrality proposals in essence are 
rooted in concerns about vertical integration.  Application of the 
conventional economic wisdom about vertical integration reveals that the 
dangers envisioned by network neutrality advocates are likely to be more 
imaginary than real.  Although considerable disagreement exists over 
many aspects of vertical integration theory, there is widespread 
agreement that certain structural preconditions must be satisfied before 
vertical integration can plausibly threaten competition.  An empirical 
analysis reveals that these preconditions are not met with respect to the 
broadband industry. 
Third, I would like to outline a new economic approach that offers a 
radically different approach to promoting competition in the physical 
layer.  One of the core insights of vertical integration theory is that any 
chain of production can maximize economic welfare only if every level of 
production is competitive.  In other words, any chain of production is 
 
and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open 
Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001); Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
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only as efficient as its least competitive link, which in the case of the 
Internet is undoubtedly the last mile.  In attempting to preserve and 
encourage competition and innovation in applications, content, and ISP 
services, these proposals are directed towards increasing competition in 
those segments of the broadband industry that are already the most 
competitive.  Instead, basic economic principles suggest that the better 
course would be to eschew attempting to foster competition in ISP 
services, content, and applications and instead to pursue regulatory 
options that would promote competition in the segment that is most 
concentrated: last-mile technologies. 
Restated in terms of the existing models of ‘‘layered competition,’’6 
the major network neutrality proposals advocate regulating the logical 
layer in a way that promotes competition in the application and content 
layers.  In the process, they direct their efforts towards the wrong policy 
problem.  Instead, the focus of public policy should be to promote 
competition in the physical layer, which remains the level of production 
that is currently the most concentrated, the least competitive, and best 
protected by barriers to entry. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the standardization implicit 
in compelled interoperability tends to reinforce and entrench the sources 
of market failure that have historically limited the level of competition 
among last-mile technologies.  The traditional justification for regulating 
wireline communications networks is that the presence of large, up-front 
sunk costs creates large supply-side economies of scale that cause markets 
for telecommunications services to collapse into natural monopolies.  
Interestingly, allowing networks to differentiate the services they offer 
can mitigate the tendency towards natural monopoly by allowing 
multiple last-mile technologies to coexist notwithstanding the presence 
of unexhausted returns to scale.  Providers confronting cost disadvantages 
inherent in the smaller scale of their operations can survive by tailoring 
their networks to the needs of subgroups who value a particular type of 
network services particularly highly in much the same manner that 
specialty stores survive in a world dominated by one-stop shopping.  
Permitting variations in the protocols and network infrastructure 
employed in broadband networks thus might enable competition to exist 
notwithstanding the presence of unexhausted returns to scale. 
For example, it is conceivable that allowing networks to differentiate 
themselves might make it possible for multiple last-mile networks to 
coexist by serving the needs of a different subgroup: one optimizing its 
network for conventional Internet applications such as e-mail and 
website access, another incorporating security features to facilitate e-
 
 6. See infra Section III.A.2. 
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commerce, a third employing routers that prioritize packets in the 
manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applications such as Internet 
telephony, generally known as ‘‘voice over Internet protocol’’ (VoIP), 
with others targeting other needs.  Conversely, mandating 
interoperability commodifies bandwidth in ways that sharply limit 
opportunities to compete on dimensions other than price, which 
reinforces the advantages enjoyed by the largest and most established 
players.  Moreover, by favoring innovation at the network’s edge to the 
exclusion of innovation in the network’s core, this approach risks 
introducing a regulation-induced bias in favor of certain types of 
applications and against others. 
Other commentators have invoked the burgeoning literature on 
network economic effects as an alternative justification for regulatory 
intervention.7  Network economic effects exist when the value of network 
access depends on the number of other users connected to the network, 
rather than the network’s technological characteristics or price.  The 
more people that are part of the network, the more valuable the network 
becomes.  As a result, a user’s decision to join a network increases the 
value of the network for others.  The fact that the new user cannot 
capture all of the benefits generated by their adoption decision has led 
many theorists to regard network economic effects as a kind of 
externality that causes overall network utilization to drop below efficient 
levels.  Some commentators also argue that network externalities can 
turn network access into a competitive weapon.  By refusing to 
interconnect with other networks, network owners can force users to 
choose one network to the exclusion of others.  Forcing users to commit 
to one network naturally leads users to flock to the largest network.  In 
short, network economic effects can create demand-side economies of 
scale analogous to the supply-side economies of scale caused by the 
presence of sunk costs. 
The current debate has overlooked a number of critical 
considerations that make it implausible that network economic effects 
are likely to harm competition.8  Even more importantly for the debates 
 
 7. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband 
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 
YALE J. ON REG. 129 (2001).  For the seminal works in the theory of network economic 
effects, see Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 
16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, 
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). 
 8. As I will subsequently discuss in greater detail, the theory of network externalities are 
largely inapplicable to physical networks such as telecommunications networks, since the 
network owner is in a position to internalize whatever externalities that may exist.  See infra 
notes 115-117 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, a network must possess market power 
before network economic effects can even plausibly harm competition.  See infra notes 113-
114 and accompanying text.  As I discuss in infra Section III.B.1, this precondition is not 
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surrounding network neutrality, compelled standardization runs the risk 
of reinforcing the tendencies towards concentration already extant in the 
broadband industry.  The economic literature recognizes that network 
diversity can ameliorate the anticompetitive effects of the demand-side 
economies of scale associated with network economic effects in much the 
same manner as it can mitigate the problems caused by supply-side 
economies of scale.  Imposing network neutrality would prevent such 
competition from emerging and would instead force networks to 
compete solely in terms of network size and price, considerations that 
tend to favor the largest players.  As a result, imposing network neutrality 
as a regulatory matter can have the perverse effect of entrenching the 
oligopoly of last-mile providers that represents the central policy problem 
facing the broadband industry.  In other words, mandating network 
neutrality raises the real danger that regulation would become the source 
of, rather than the solution to, market failure.  Such considerations are 
particularly problematic when the industry is undergoing dynamic 
technological change, as is the case in broadband. 
Emphasizing the potential harms associated with compelling 
network neutrality as a regulatory matter is not inconsistent with 
recognizing the value of adhering to standardization as a default 
principle.  Interoperability and the end-to-end argument clearly offer 
benefits to both providers and consumers, and network designers should 
hesitate before deviating from those central precepts.  Indeed, I would 
expect that most industry participants would voluntarily design their 
technologies to be fully interoperable and compatible in the vast majority 
of cases even in the absence of regulation.  The question posed by the 
debate over network neutrality is not whether consumers benefit from 
standardization; they clearly do.  To the extent that is true, there is no 
need to mandate network neutrality, since the benefits to consumers 
from standardization should be reflected in market outcomes.  The real 
issue posed by the network neutrality debate is whether regulators should 
step in and impose standardization in those situations where the market 
exhibits a preference for differentiation.  The fact that the structure of 
the broadband industry makes it unlikely that any network owner will be 
able to use nonstandardization to harm competition indicates that such 
intervention is unwarranted.  In addition, by preventing last-mile 
providers from tailoring their networks to pursue alternative strategies, 
barring network diversity threatens to make matters worse. 
The balance of this article is organized as follows.  Section I 
describes the Internet’s basic structure and lays out the issues surrounding 
the network neutrality debate.  Section II evaluates the end-to-end 
 
satisfied with respect to the broadband industry. 
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argument, concluding that it does not support the imposition of network 
neutrality as a regulatory mandate.  Section III demonstrates the close 
relationship between network neutrality and the economics of vertical 
integration.  It also examines the structure of the broadband industry, 
concluding that the structural preconditions needed for vertical 
integration to pose a threat to competition are not satisfied.  Section IV 
analyzes the potential benefits of allowing last-mile providers to deviate 
from complete interoperability.  Allowing last-mile providers to use 
vertical integration to differentiate their networks would allow the 
realization of certain efficiencies and would permit them to offer a 
broader range of services better attuned to consumers’ preferences.  Even 
more importantly, requiring all broadband networks to use 
nonproprietary protocols can actually reduce competition by reinforcing 
the economies of scale already enjoyed by large telecommunications 
providers.  Section V discusses the proper role of regulation, concluding 
that regulatory authorities will be more effective at promoting entry by 
new network platforms than they would be in ascertaining whether a 
particular exclusivity arrangement would promote or hinder competition.  
Indeed, one of the benefits of pursing the strategy of promoting entry is 
that it has embedded within it a built-in exit strategy.  Once a sufficient 
number of broadband network platforms exist, regulatory intervention 
will no longer be necessary. 
I. FRAMING THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE 
Understanding the debates about broadband regulation requires an 
appreciation for certain key features of the Internet’s underlying 
structure.9  In order to facilitate the discussion, Part A offers a simplified 
description of the basic structure of the original narrowband Internet.  
Part B identifies the key architectural changes effected by the migration 
to broadband technologies.  Part C considers the impact of shifts in 
users’ relationship with the Internet.  Part D examines how these various 
transformations have shaped the debates about network neutrality that 
have arisen in the broadband regulatory proceedings. 
A. The Architecture of the Narrowband Internet 
As has been often noted, the Internet is not a single, monolithic 
network.  Rather it is a network of networks that are interconnected 
together.  When the Internet first became popular, it was fairly easy to 
divide components of the network into three categories.10  The core of 
 
 9. Those already familiar with the Internet and the debates about network neutrality 
may wish to skip directly to Section II. 
 10. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
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the Internet is provided by backbone providers, such as AT&T, Cable & 
Wireless, Level 3, MCI WorldCom, and Qwest.11  Backbones are high-
bandwidth, long-haul network providers that carry traffic between a 
limited number of recognized locations.  By 1998, backbones 
interconnected through eleven public access points.12  Since that time, 
major backbone providers have increasingly interconnected directly at 
private locations. 
The final connection is provided by last-mile providers, which carry 
data traffic from central facilities located in different metropolitan areas 
to end users.  In the narrowband world, last-mile services are almost 
invariably provided by the local telephone company.  Narrowband 
customers typically connect by using a dial-up modem to place a 
conventional telephone call routed to another location within the same 
local calling area.  Customers with higher volumes of data traffic employ 
more sophisticated telephone technologies, such as T-1 or T-3 lines, 
integrated services digital networks (ISDN), frame relay, or fiber optics.13 
The gap between the limited geographic points served by backbone 
providers and the widely dispersed locations of last-mile providers is 
bridged by a third category of network provider, commonly called ISPs.14  
The best known ISPs include America Online, MSN, Earthlink, Juno, 
and Netzero.  ISPs typically have a higher port density and carry a lower 
volume of traffic at lower speeds than backbone providers.  In addition to 
carrying traffic between the NAPs and the points of presence  
    
 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd. 20,913, 20,922-38 ¶¶ 16-59 (2000) (categorizing 
Internet network providers into a similar three-part taxonomy). 
 11. Backbone providers are also called ‘‘tier 1 ISPs.’’ 
 12. The original backbone supported by the National Science Foundation until 1995 
(known as NSFNet) carried traffic between three ‘‘network access points’’ (NAPs) located in 
San Francisco, Chicago, and New York.  The restrictions the NSF placed on commercial uses 
of the backbone led a group of private companies to create an additional interconnection point 
known as the ‘‘commercial internet exchange’’ (CIX) located in Santa Clara, California.  The 
federal government also established federal internet exchange (FIX) points in College Park, 
Maryland, and Mountain View, California.  In addition, Metropolitan Fiber Systems, Inc. 
(now owned by WorldCom) expanded the fiber rings that it established in Chicago, Dallas, 
Los Angeles, San Jose, and Washington, D.C. into ‘‘metropolitan area exchanges’’ (MAEs) 
that essentially performed the same functions as NAPs.  See Jack Rickard, The Internet-What 
Is It?, BOARDWATCH, Winter 1998, available at http://www2.cs.uh.edu/~klong/papers/ 
WhatIsTheInternet.pdf; Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet 
Backbones, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 48-50 (2003). 
 13. Kende, supra note 12 at 46. 
 14. National companies who connect local points of presence to NAPs are often called 
tier 2 ISPs.  Regional providers are often called tier 3 ISPs.  Note that many providers that I 
have termed backbone providers refer to themselves as ISPs.  For simplicity, I will refer to tier 
1 ISPs as ‘‘backbone providers’’ and reserve the term ‘‘ISP’’ for tier 2 and tier 3 providers. 
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FIGURE 1 
BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF NARROWBAND TECHNOLOGIES 
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within each last-mile provider’s service area, ISPs perform a number of 
other functions, including supplying e-mail servers, hosting end users’ 
webpages, and caching the most popular content locally so that 
customers can access it more easily.  ISPs also often offer portal services 
and proprietary content, which allow them to add value through their 
‘‘unique aggregation and presentation of content that allowed for easy 
consumption by end users.’’15 
Once a narrowband ISP receives a call, the ISP demodulates the 
signal from the dial-up modem and routes the traffic onto its own 
packet-switched networks.  If the packets are addressed to a destination 
located on the same ISP network (such as an e-mail address associated 
with a different customer of the same ISP), the ISP conveys them to 
their destination without involving any other ISPs or backbones.  If the 
packets are addressed to a more distant location, the ISP hands off the 
packets to a backbone provider, which in turn may hand off the packets 
to one or more downstream backbone providers.  Eventually, one of the 
backbones hands off the packets to the destination ISP or a private data 
network, which in turn delivers them to their termination point. 
The narrowband network configuration possesses two features that 
have influenced the debates about network neutrality.  First, the last-mile 
 
 15. Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 5, at 634. 
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provider does not need to maintain any packet-switching capability of its 
own.  Instead, it simply routes calls it receives on an inbound local 
telephone line through its central office switch to an outbound local 
telephone line without modifying the traffic in any way.  This 
transparency makes last-mile narrowband connections 
nondiscriminatory.  Because customers can use the local telephone 
network to call any other customer connected to the network, all a 
narrowband ISP needs from the last-mile provider is an appropriate 
number of incoming business lines. 
Second, the movement of packets through ISPs and backbone 
providers is controlled by a family of nonproprietary protocols known as 
the transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP).  For our 
purposes, the most distinctive feature of TCP/IP is that it routes all 
packets in a nondiscriminatory (i.e., first come, first served) manner 
without regard to the packet’s content, point of origin, or associated 
application. 
B. Architectural Changes Resulting from the Migration to 
Broadband 
The arrival of broadband technologies has effected some 
fundamental changes in the Internet’s architecture.  Many residences and 
small businesses now have the option of contacting the Internet through 
cable modem systems maintained by local cable operators, such as 
Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Cox, and Charter, or through a digital 
subscriber line (DSL) service offered by local telephone companies, such 
as Verizon, SBC, Qwest, and BellSouth. 
Because both DSL and cable modem providers use the same 
infrastructure to provide two different types of service (either cable 
television combined with cable modem service or local telephone service 
combined with DSL), both types of providers must maintain equipment 
to segregate the two different communication streams.  DSL systems 
route traffic through devices known as a digital subscriber line access 
multiplexers (DSLAMs), which separate the voice communications from 
the data-based communications.16  Cable operators employ devices 
known as frequency up-converters and a cable modem termination 
systems (CMTSs) to divide the video and data streams.17 
 
 16. Note that although most DSLAMs are located in the central office switch, some local 
telephone companies are deploying digital loop carrier (DLC) architectures that allow 
DSLAMs to be located in remote terminals.  Locating DSLAMs closer to end users 
represents one way to increase the coverage area of DSL service.  See Daniel F. Spulber & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 885, 1004-05 (2003). 
 17. See id. at 1014-15. 
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FIGURE 2 
BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF BROADBAND TECHNOLOGIES 
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Unlike what was the case in the narrowband world, last-mile 
broadband providers must maintain a packet-switched network in their 
main facilities to hold and route the stream of data packets after they 
have been separated from other types of communications.  Thus, under a 
broadband architecture, last-mile providers no longer serve as mere pass-
throughs.  They must instead necessarily perform the same routing 
functions previously carried out by ISPs.  Indeed, some last-mile 
broadband providers have negotiated their own interconnection 
agreements with backbone providers and require all of their customers to 
use their own proprietary ISP, thereby supplanting the role of 
independent ISPs altogether.  The migration of Internet users from 
narrowband to broadband technologies has thus had the inevitable effect 
of reducing the viability of many independent ISPs and encouraging last-
mile providers to bundle their offerings with ISP services. 
C. Shifts in User Demand 
The advent of broadband technologies has also largely coincided 
with a number of fundamental changes in user demands that are placing 
increasing pressure on the continued adherence to a uniform, TCP/IP-
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based architecture.  Although the forces are somewhat complex, a few 
examples illustrate the forces driving this fundamental shift.18 
1. The Shift from Institutional to Mass-Market Users 
The termination of NSF support for backbone services in 1995 
eliminated the few remaining restraints on the commercialization of the 
Internet.  The Internet’s transformation from a network designed 
primarily to facilitate academic interchange into a medium of mass 
communications has made managing the Internet considerably more 
complicated.  The Internet was once only charged with bringing together 
a relatively small number of fairly sophisticated, institutional users who 
generally shared common goals.  It now must mediate among an 
increasingly disorderly onslaught of private users each pursuing ever  
more divergent objectives.  This has greatly complicated traffic 
management, as the variability in usage patterns has increased and the 
beneficial effects of shared institutional norms and relationships have 
dwindled.  This shift has also created pressure to simplify the demands 
imposed on end users by incorporating more of those functions into the 
core network. 
2. The Emergence of Network-Intensive Applications 
By contemporary standards, early Internet applications, such as e-
mail, web access, newsgroups, and file transfer, placed fairly modest 
demands on the network.  Overall file sizes were relatively small, and 
delays of a second or two typically went unnoticed.  The 
commercialization of the Internet has spurred the development of 
applications which place greater demands on network services.  
Bandwidth-hungry applications, such as music downloads, on-line 
gaming, and streaming video, are placing increasing pressure on network 
capacity, as has the growth in telecommuting and home networking.  
Equally important is the emergence of applications that are less tolerant 
of variations in throughput rates, such as streaming media and Internet 
telephony. 
 
 18. The discussion that follows draws in part on the analysis offered by Marjory S. 
Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End 
Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 70 
(2001), reprinted in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND 
BEYOND 91 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001); see also Hans Kruse, 
William Yurcik & Lawrence Lessig, The InterNAT: Policy Implications for Internet 
Architecture Debate (unpublished manuscript presented at the 28th Annual 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), available at http://www.tprc.org/ 
abstracts00/internatpap.pdf. 
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These concerns have led many network providers to make the terms 
of interconnection vary with bandwidth usage.  For example, many last-
mile providers either forbid end users to use bandwidth-intensive 
applications, such as music downloads, streaming media, and website 
hosting, or instead require that they pay higher charges before doing so.19  
Similarly, backbone providers often base the amounts they charge for 
interconnection on volume-related considerations.  Backbones who 
exchange traffic of roughly equal value enter into ‘‘peering’’ arrangements 
that are similar to telecommunications arrangements known as ‘‘bill and 
keep.’’  Under peering arrangements, the originating backbone collects 
and retains all of the compensation for the transaction notwithstanding 
the fact that other backbones also incur costs to terminate the 
transaction.  So long as the traffic initiated and terminated by each 
backbone is roughly equal in value, peering allows backbones to forego 
the costs of metering and billing these termination costs without 
suffering any adverse economic impact.  Peering is not economical, 
however, in cases where the value of the traffic being terminated is not 
reciprocal.  As a result, smaller-volume backbones are often required to 
enter into ‘‘transit’’ arrangements in which they must pay larger 
backbones compensation for terminating their traffic.20 
The growing importance of time-sensitive applications is also 
placing pressure on system designers to employ ‘‘policy-based routers,’’ 
which can discriminate among packets and assign them different levels of 
priority, depending upon the source of the packet or the nature of the 
application being run.  This represents a marked departure from 
TCP/IP, which manages packets on a ‘‘first come, first served’’ basis and 
in which packets are routed without regard to the nature of the 
communications being transmitted. 
3. The Growth in Distrust of Other Endpoints 
As noted earlier, TCP/IP, which still represents the dominant suite 
of protocols employed by the Internet, dictates that packets be routed 
without regard to their source.  The anonymity of this system of 
transmission was implicitly built on the presumption that the other 
endpoints in the system were relatively trustworthy and were cooperating 
in order to achieve common goals. 
The rise of e-commerce has created the need for increased levels of 
confidence in the identity of the person on the other end of the 
connection.  At the same time, end users have become increasingly 
 
 19. Wu, supra note 5, at 152-54, 157-62. 
 20. See Kende, supra note 12, at 47-52 (providing an overview of backbone ‘‘peering’’ and 
‘‘transit’’). 
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frustrated by intrusions thrust upon them by other end users.  Although 
some examples, such as spam, are relatively innocuous, other examples 
are considerably more malicious, such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses,21 
pornographic websites masquerading as less objectionable content, and 
programs that mine cookies for private information.  Although end users 
are in a position to undertake certain measures to protect themselves 
against these harms, some Internet providers are interposing elements 
into the body of their network to shield end users from such dangers. 
4. The Needs of Law Enforcement 
The demands of law enforcement represent another factor that is 
driving the Internet away from the anonymous, fully interoperable 
architecture that existed in the narrowband era.  For example, the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
requires that all telecommunications carriers configure their networks in 
a way that permits law enforcement officials to place wiretaps on 
telephone calls.22  Emerging Internet telephone systems are not easily 
rendered wiretap compatible.  In contrast to the architecture of 
conventional telephone networks, which requires that all voice traffic 
pass through a discrete number of network gateways, Internet telephony 
technologies rely upon the decentralized structure inherent in the 
Internet.  Furthermore, even if law enforcement officials found an 
appropriate location to intercept Internet telephone traffic, the packet 
anonymity inherent in TCP/IP would make it extremely difficult for law 
enforcement officials to separate the telephony-related packets from the 
other packets in the data stream.  As a result, the FCC recently issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling tentatively 
concluding that CALEA applies to all facilities-based providers of any 
type of broadband Internet access service and to managed or mediated 
Internet telephony services.23  Similarly, states’ desire to impose sales 
taxes on Internet transactions may prompt them to push for changes to 
the architecture of the Internet to permit them to conduct some degree 
of monitoring of on-line commercial activity.  Any solution to either 
problem would almost certainly require a deviation from the content and 
application transparency inherent in TCP/IP. 
 
 21. Trojan horses are malicious pieces of code concealed within programs that perform 
beneficial functions. 
 22. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000). 
 23. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access 
Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, FCC 04-187, slip op. at 
18-35 ¶¶ 17-59 (F.C.C. Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-04-187A1.pdf. 
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D. Network Neutrality Proposals 
Together these changes are placing increasing pressure on last-mile 
broadband providers to configure their networks in ways that 
differentiate among packets on the basis of the source, application, or 
content associated with it.  These moves towards discriminatory 
treatment have raised the concern that some providers will use their 
control over the last mile to harm competition.  Advocates of network 
neutrality have advanced two different types of regulatory proposals to 
curb the dangers that they perceive.24  The first, known as ‘‘multiple ISP 
access,’’ would require last-mile providers to serve all ISPs on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.  The second, sometimes called ‘‘connectivity 
principles,’’ would limit last-mile providers’ ability to restrict end users’ 
ability from attaching devices, running applications, and accessing 
content as they see fit. 
1. Multiple ISP Access 
The fact that some last-mile broadband providers require their 
customers to connect to the Internet through their own proprietary ISP 
has prompted calls for the FCC to prohibit such exclusivity arrangements 
and to require that last-mile providers make their networks accessible to 
all unaffiliated ISPs on a nondiscriminatory basis.  The concern is that 
allowing the broadband provider to control the market for ISP services 
has the potential to reduce consumer choice and harm competition.  The 
opposing sides each attempted to gain the rhetorical high ground by 
employing terminology designed to color the way the FCC viewed the 
issue.  Network neutrality advocates attempted to frame the issue as 
focusing on ‘‘open access,’’ while broadband network owners referred to 
the issue as ‘‘forced access.’’25  In an apparent attempt to sidestep the 
political overtones associated with either designation, the FCC has since 
framed the issue as ‘‘multiple ISP access.’’26 
The FCC has vacillated on multiple ISP access over the course of 
various merger clearance proceedings.27  The agency initially rejected  
 
 24. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 41, 44-48 (2004) (distinguishing between the two approaches to network neutrality); 
Wu, supra note 5, at 147-50 (same). 
 25. See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816, 9866 ¶ 114 (2000) [hereinafter 
AT&T-MediaOne Merger]. 
 26. See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 2, at 4839 ¶ 72. 
 27. For a more detailed review of the regulatory history of multiple ISP access, see 
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 251-52 (2002); Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1015-18. 
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calls for multiple ISP access when clearing AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI 
and MediaOne,28 only to backtrack somewhat by acceding to a multiple 
ISP access requirement imposed by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) during the America Online-Time Warner merger.29  Since then, 
the FCC has returned to its original position, declining to impose 
multiple ISP access when approving the sale of AT&T’s cable properties 
to Comcast.30  At the same time, the FCC has successfully forestalled 
attempts by cities to impose multiple ISP access either as a matter of 
municipal ordinances31 or as part of their approval of the transfer of 
licenses needed to complete these mergers32 on the grounds that such 
regulation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government.  Throughout these preemption disputes, the FCC 
continued to emphasize that it had not yet determined whether to 
impose open access and asked the courts not to resolve the issue.33 
It is only recently that the FCC has finally begun to address the 
issue in earnest.  In the ongoing cable modem proceedings, the FCC has 
twice requested comment on the advisability of requiring cable modem 
systems to provide multiple ISP access.34  It also raised the issue in the 
ongoing wireline broadband proceedings, seeking comment on whether 
it should impose multiple ISP access on DSL providers in the event that 
it decided to exempt them from the unbundled network element (UNE) 
 
 28. AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 25, at 9866 ¶¶ 114-115; Applications for 
Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-
Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 3160, 3197-98 ¶ 75 (1999) [hereinafter TCI-AT&T Merger]. 
 29. Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time 
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547, 6568-69 ¶¶ 
57-58 (2001) [hereinafter Time Warner-AOL Merger]; America Online, Inc., Decision & 
Order, No. C-3989, slip op. at 2, 6-9, 11-17 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf. 
 30. Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses from Comcast Corp. 
and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 23,246, 23,300-01 ¶ 135 (2002). 
 31. See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 
2d 685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
 32. See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 
2001); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 33. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Communications Commission at 15-18, 
MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico (Nos. 00-1680(L), 00-1709, 00-1719) (available 
at 2000 WL 33991834); Brief of the Federal Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae 
at 19-26, 30-31, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland (No. 99-35609) (available at 1999 WL 
33631595). 
 34. The FCC made its initial request in 2000 when issuing its Notice of Inquiry in the 
cable modem proceeding.  See Cable Modem NOI, supra note 2, at 19,298-306 ¶¶ 25-49.  It 
reiterated the request in its subsequent Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in 2002.  See Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM, supra note 2, at 
4839-41 ¶¶ 72-74, 4843-47 ¶¶ 80-93. 
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access requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.35  
The FCC’s request for comments would prove prescient, as the 
subsequent Triennial Review Order would eventually strike most DSL-
related facilities from the list of network elements to which 
telecommunications carriers have the right of unbundled access.36 
A number of entities have submitted comments calling upon the 
FCC to mandate multiple ISP access.37  An alliance of trade associations 
representing the computer, telecommunications equipment, 
semiconductor, consumer electronics, software and manufacturing 
sectors known as the High Tech Broadband Coalition (HTBC)38 has 
offered a more limited proposal, which calls for the FCC to require DSL 
providers to honor any existing access agreements with unaffiliated ISPs 
and to make any arrangements with their affiliated ISPs available to 
unaffiliated ISPs in a nondiscriminatory manner for a period of at least 
two years.39 
2. Connectivity Principles 
Other proposals have shifted their attention away from preserving 
ISP competition and have instead focused on preserving competition 
among content and applications providers.  For example, Professors 
Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig have proposed a network neutrality 
regime that would prohibit last-mile providers from imposing any 
restrictions on end users’ ability to run the applications, attach the 
devices, and access the content of their own choosing except those 
restrictions that are necessary to comply with a legal duty, prevent 
 
 35. See Wireline Modem NPRM, supra note 2, at 3042-43 ¶¶ 50-52. 
 36. Competitors remain free, however, to obtain unbundled access to the entire local loop 
and provide both voice and DSL services.  See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling 
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report & Order & Order on Remand & 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 17,131-36 ¶¶ 255-63 (2003), 
aff’d in relevant part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-85 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
 37. See Comments of Amazon.com at 9, Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM 
(F.C.C. filed June 17, 2002) (CS Dkt. No. 02-52), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ 
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513198055; EarthLink, Inc. Comments 
in CS Docket No. 02-52 at 3-14, Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM (F.C.C. filed 
June 17, 2002) (CS Dkt. No. 02-52), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve. 
cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513198478. 
 38. The specific trade associations include the Business Software Alliance, Consumer 
Electronics Association, Information Technology Industry Council, National Association of 
Manufacturers, Semiconductor Industry Association, and Telecommunications Industry 
Association.  It has the active support of such companies as Intel, Alcatel, Catera, and 
Corning. 
 39. Reply Comments of High Tech Broadband Coalition at i-ii, 6-8, Appropriate 
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities (F.C.C. filed July 1, 
2002) (CC Dkt. No. 02-33). 
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physical harm to the network, prevent interference with other users’ 
connections, ensure quality of service, and prevent violations of security.40 
HTBC has advanced a similar proposal that would impose a series 
of ‘‘connectivity principles’’ on all last-mile broadband providers.  This 
proposal would require that all last-mile broadband providers give end 
users unrestricted access to all content and allow them to run any 
applications and attach any devices they desire, so long as these efforts do 
not harm the providers’ networks, enable theft of services, or exceed the 
bandwidth limitations of the particular service plan.41  The HTBC’s 
proposal has drawn the support of a group composed primarily of 
software and content providers known as the Coalition of Broadband 
Users and Innovators (CBUI).42  FCC Chairman Michael Powell 
sounded similar themes when called upon the broadband industry to 
embrace a series of ‘‘Internet Freedoms.’’  In sharp contrast to the 
HTBC’s proposal, however, Powell’s vision would arise through 
voluntary conduct rather than through regulation.43 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF END-TO-END 
As noted earlier, network neutrality advocates have drawn much of 
the inspiration for their regulatory proposals from the end-to-end 
argument pioneered by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark.  Simply put, the end-
to-end argument counsels against introducing intelligence into the core 
of the Internet and in favor of restricting higher levels of functionality to 
the servers operating at the edges of the network.  The ‘‘pipes’’ that 
constitute the core of the network should be kept ‘‘dumb’’ and should 
focus solely on passing along packets as quickly as possible.  Part A 
describes the basic intuitions underlying the end-to-end argument.  Part 
B undertakes a close analysis of the implications of the end-to-end 
argument for the major regulatory proposals, concluding that network 
neutrality proposals are based on an over reading of Saltzer, Reed, and 
 
 40. Ex parte Letter of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig, Cable Modem Declaratory 
Ruling and NPRM, at 12-15 (F.C.C. filed Aug. 22, 2003) (CS Docket No. 02-52), available 
at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 
6514683884; see also Wu, supra note 5, at 165-72. 
 41. Comments of the High Tech Broadband Coalition at 6-9, Cable Modem 
Declaratory Ruling & NPRM (F.C.C. filed June 17, 2002) (CC Dkt. No. 02-52), available at 
http:// gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513198026. 
 42. Ex parte Communication from the Coalition of Broadband Users and Innovators at 
3-4, Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling and NPRM (F.C.C. filed Jan. 8, 2003) (CS Dkt. No. 
02-52), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 
document=6513401671.  CBUI includes such notable content and software providers as 
Microsoft, Disney, Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo!, as well as the Media Access Project, the 
Consumer Electronics Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers. 
 43. See generally Michael K. Powell, The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a 
Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5 (2004). 
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Clark’s work that expands it far outside its proper scope.  In fact, a 
careful examination of the rationale underlying the end-to-end argument 
reveals that it is fundamentally incompatible with network neutrality 
advocates’ attempts to turn the end-to-end argument into a regulatory 
mandate. 
A. The Classic Statement of the End-to-End Architecture 
The fundamental logic of the end-to-end argument is most easily 
understood by examining the core illustration offered by Saltzer, Reed, 
and Clark to articulate it: careful file transfer, in which a file stored on 
the hard drive of computer A is transferred to the hard drive of computer 
B without errors.44  Roughly speaking, this function can be divided into 
five steps: 
1. Computer A reads the file from its hard disk and passes 
it to the file transfer program. 
2. The file transfer program running on computer A 
prepares the file for transmission by dividing it into 
packets and hands off the packets to the data 
communication network. 
3. The data communication network moves the packets 
from computer A to computer B. 
4. The file transfer program running on computer B 
reassembles the packets into a coherent file. 
5. The file transfer program saves the file onto computer 
B’s hard disk. 
Errors can emerge at any step in this process.  Computer A can misread 
the file from the hard disk.  The file transfer program on Computer A 
can introduce mistakes when copying the data from the file.  The 
communication network can drop or change bits in a packet or lose a 
packet altogether.  The file transfer program on Computer B can also 
produce errors when converting the packets back into a coherent file.  
Computer B can miswrite the file to its hard disk.  The transfer can also 
be jeopardized by larger-scale hardware or software failures. 
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark compare two different approaches to 
managing the risk of such errors.  One approach is to perform error 
checking at each intermediate step along the way.  The other approach is 
known as ‘‘end-to-end check and retry.’’  Under this approach, no error 
 
 44. The discussion that follows is based on Saltzer et al., supra note 4, at 278-80. 
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checking is performed at any of the intermediate steps.  Instead, the only 
error checking occurs when the terminating end of the process (computer 
B) verifies the accuracy of the file transfer with the initiating end 
(computer A) after the entire transaction has been completed. 
The core conclusion of Saltzer, Reed, and Clark’s work is that 
system designers should adopt a presumption in favor of the latter 
approach.  They base their argument on two insights.  First, no matter 
how many intermediate error checks are introduced, the terminating end 
of the file transfer must still verify the transaction with the originating 
end after all of the steps have been completed.  The fact that such end-
to-end verification is necessary no matter what other intermediate 
reliability measures are built into the system renders any additional 
measures redundant, thus raising doubts as to the justifiability of any 
additional measures.45 
Second, intermediate error checking should properly be regarded as 
an engineering tradeoff between reliability and performance.  Errors can 
be reduced, but only at the cost of introducing a degree of redundancy 
into the network that will have the inevitable effect of slowing it down.  
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark emphasize that different applications vary in 
their tolerance for unreliability as well as their demand for speed.  
Imposing reliability checks in low-level subsystems that are common to 
all applications may have the uneconomical result of forcing all 
applications to incur the performance costs even if the increase in 
reliability does not provide particular applications with commensurate 
benefits.46 
Together these insights suggest that system designers should avoid 
designing higher-level functions into routers located in the core of the 
network.  Instead, the Internet should presumptively be engineered with 
any such functions concentrated in the servers that operate at the 
network’s edge.  Saltzer, Reed, and Clark extend the same basic rationale 
to other system functions, such as delivery guarantees, secure 
transmission of data, duplicate message suppression, and transaction 
management.47 
B. End-to-End as a Case-by-Case Approach 
Network neutrality proponents contend that the end-to-end 
argument justifies prohibiting Internet providers from introducing 
additional degrees of intelligence into their core networks.  In short, all 
of the intelligence should be restricted to the servers operating at the 
 
 45. Id. at 281. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 282-84. 
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edge of the network.  They also argue that the end-to-end argument 
mandates that all broadband network owners employ protocols like 
TCP/IP that ensure that the core of the network remains relatively 
transparent and dumb.48 
Although the end-to-end argument does support a presumption 
against introducing higher-level functions into the network’s core, it does 
not justify elevating this presumption into an inviolable precept.  
Conceding that it is ‘‘too simplistic to conclude that the lower levels 
should play no part in obtaining reliability,’’49 Saltzer, Reed, and Clark’s 
original article articulating the end-to-end argument squarely concludes 
that ‘‘the end-to-end argument is not an absolute rule, but rather a 
guideline that helps in application and protocol design analysis.’’50  In 
fact, the cost-performance tradeoff underlying the end-to-end argument 
requires ‘‘subtlety of analysis’’ and can be ‘‘quite complex.’’51  Indeed, a 
later article by the same authors responding to calls for allowing the core 
of the Internet to exercise a greater level of functionality explicitly 
recognizes that ‘‘[t]here are some situations where applying an end-to-
end argument is counterproductive’’52 and concludes that the proper 
approach is to ‘‘take it case-by-case.’’53  The end-to-end argument is thus 
more properly regarded as merely ‘‘one of several important organizing 
principles for systems design’’ rather than as an absolute.54  Although 
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark suggest that deviations from it will be rare, they 
acknowledge that ‘‘there will be situations where other principles or goals 
have greater weight.’’55 
Other technologists have drawn similar conclusions.  One of the 
original authors of the end-to-end argument, writing with Marjory 
Blumenthal, candidly acknowledges that ‘‘the end-to-end arguments are 
not offered as an absolute’’ and that ‘‘[t]here are functions that can only 
be implemented in the core of the network.’’56  Indeed, they argue that 
the developments described in Section I have made the case for 
introducing greater intelligence into Internet’s core all the more 
 
 48. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 5, at 931-32. 
 49. Saltzer et al., supra note 4, at 280. 
 50. Id. at 285. 
 51. Id. at 284.  To take but one example, the desirability of end-to-end depends in part 
on the length of the file.  If a system drops one message per one hundred messages sent, the 
probability that all packets will arrive correctly decreases exponentially as the length of the file 
increases (and thus the number of packets composing the file) increases.  Id. at 280-81. 
 52. David P. Reed et al., Commentaries on ‘‘Active Networking and End-to-End 
Arguments,’’ 12 IEEE NETWORK 69, 69 n.1 (1998). 
 53. Id. at 70. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 18, at 71. 
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compelling.  They conclude, apparently with the concurrence of Saltzer,57 
that in many cases ‘‘an end-to-end argument isn’t appropriate in the first 
place.’’58  Samrat Bhattacharjee, Kenneth Calvert, and Ellen Zegura 
conclude that the end-to-end argument ‘‘do[es] not rule out support for 
higher-level functionality within the networks’’ and instead simply 
requires that the costs and benefits inherent in the engineering tradeoff 
be carefully evaluated.59  Indeed, there are services that depend on 
information that is only available inside the network and thus cannot 
exist without relying to some degree on what has been called ‘‘active 
networking.’’60  Dale Hatfield acknowledges that the desire to improve 
the security, manageability, scalability, and reliability of the Internet may 
justify introducing greater intelligence into the core of the network.61  As 
a result, Hatfield argues against allowing regulation that prevents 
network owners from deviating from the end-to-end architecture and 
instead simply warns that deviations from the end-to-end argument 
should be undertaken with extreme care.62 
At this point, the incongruity of invoking the end-to-end argument 
as support for network neutrality as a regulatory mandate should be 
apparent.  Far from justifying an absolute prohibition against placing 
intelligence in the core of the network, the end-to-end argument stands 
squarely opposed to such a simplistic approach.63  Simply put, a close 
analysis of the end-to-end argument reveals that it does not support the 
proposition for which many network neutrality proponents invoke it.  
Indeed, as Marjory Blumenthal has noted, this incongruity demonstrates 
the extent to which network neutrality advocates’ embrace of the end-to-
end argument has left the realm of cost-benefit analysis and has instead 
 
 57. See id. at 102 n.19 (citing personal communication with Jerome Saltzer as support for 
this proposition). 
 58. Id. at 80. 
 59. Samrat Bhattacharjee et al., Active Networking and the End-to-End Argument, 
1997 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON NETWORK PROTOCOLS 220, 221. 
 60. Id.; see also Samrat Bhattacharjee et al., Commentaries on ‘‘Active Networking and 
End-to-End Arguments,’’ 12 IEEE NETWORK 66 (1998). 
 61. Dale N. Hatfield, Preface, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 3 (2000). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Although the end-to-end argument only supports a case-by-case approach to network 
design, it is arguable that such cases will prove so rare that the costs of evaluating the merits of 
each individual case exceed the benefits of doing so.  Such categorical balancing is particularly 
perilous in industries, such as broadband, that are in a state of technological and economic 
flux.  Even if regulators were to strike the proper balance today, the underlying technological 
and economic context would soon shift.  A real danger exists that this inherent lag will cause 
regulation intended to promote economic efficiency to inhibit it.  See, e.g., STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286-87 (1982); 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its 
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 611-15 (1969).  Such concerns counsel strongly in favor of 
allowing private ordering rather than the government to determine network configurations. 
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entered the realm of ideology.64  As a result, it is critical that network 
neutrality proposals not evade critical analysis by masquerading as 
nothing more than the application of sound engineering principles. 
The foregoing discussion casts a new and somewhat ironic light on 
Lessig’s observation that ‘‘code is law.’’65  The point Lessig was 
attempting to make was that the architecture enshrined in the Internet’s 
communications protocols can have as dramatic an impact on 
competition and innovation as direct regulation.  Most network 
neutrality advocates have failed to appreciate that this admonition cuts 
both ways.66  While it is true that allowing Internet providers to impose 
proprietary protocols could have a significant impact on innovation and 
competition, forbidding them from doing so could have equally dramatic 
effects.  Either decision necessarily involves policymakers in the 
unenviable task of picking technological winners and losers.  The 
impossibility of technologically neutral government intervention 
undercuts claims that imposing the end-to-end argument as a regulatory 
mandate represents the proper way to show humility about the future of 
the Internet.67 
Not only does government-imposed network neutrality contradict 
the letter of the end-to-end argument, it turns Lessig’s admonition on its 
head.  Lessig intended the statement to indicate how the architecture of 
the Internet could constitute a private substitute for many of the 
functions previously served by law.  Indeed, Lessig warned of the dangers 
of allowing the government to dictate the standards that must be 
included in Internet code.68  It would be a strange inversion of this 
argument to give the phrase ‘‘code is law’’ literal rather than figurative 
meaning and to sanction greater governmental control over the 
architecture of the Internet. 
III. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NETWORK NEUTRALITY 
AND THE ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
In addition to misunderstanding the proper scope of the end-to-end 
argument, network neutrality proponents have largely overlooked the 
close relationship between their proposals and the economics of vertical 
integration.  This section examines how vertical integration theory sheds 
new light on the debates surrounding network neutrality.  Part A reviews 
 
 64. Marjory S. Blumenthal, End-to-End and Subsequent Paradigms, 2002 L. REV. 
MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 709, 710 (2002). 
 65. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999). 
 66. For a notable exception, see Wu, supra note 5, at 148. 
 67. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 35, 39. 
 68. See Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the 
Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 764-67 (1999). 
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the structure of the broadband industry and describes how network 
neutrality is designed to redress the supposed problems caused by vertical 
integration.  The relationship between network neutrality and vertical 
integration is clear whether one conceives of the broadband industry as 
consisting of a traditional, three-step chain of production implicit in 
multiple ISP access proposals or whether one follows the more recent 
trend of describing the broadband industry as consisting of a series of 
horizontal ‘‘layers’’ underlying the regulatory approach embodied in the 
connectivity principles. 
Part B reviews the key insights of vertical integration theory.  It is 
now widely recognized that vertical integration can create economic 
harms only if certain structural preconditions are met.  An empirical 
analysis reveals that these structural preconditions are not satisfied with 
respect to the broadband industry.  This in turn undermines claims that 
the types of vertical integration that network neutrality is designed to 
foreclose poses a serious policy concern. 
A. Two Conceptions on the Structure of the Broadband Industry 
The major network neutrality proposals have embedded within 
them two, rather different conceptions of the vertical structure of the 
broadband industry.  Multiple ISP access proposals implicitly conceive of 
providers being organized in a traditional, three-step chain of 
distribution, in which the ISPs act as a wholesaler and the last-mile 
providers play the role of the retailer.  The proponents of connectivity 
principles conceive of the broadband industry as consisting of a series of 
layers. 
1. The Conventional Vertical Market Structure Implicit in 
Multiple ISP Access 
Although the structure of the broadband industry may at times 
seem mysterious, it is in fact quite ordinary when viewed from a certain 
perspective.69  Its basic organization differs little from that of the typical 
manufacturing industry, which is divided into a three-stage chain of 
production.  The first and last stages are easiest to understand.  The 
manufacturing stage is occupied by companies that create the actual 
products to be sold.  The retail stage consists of those companies 
responsible for the final delivery of the products to end-users.  Although 
it is theoretically possible for retailers to purchase products directly from 
manufacturers, in practice logistical complications often give rise to an 
intermediate stage mediating between manufacturers and retailers.  
 
 69. The following discussion is adapted from Yoo, supra note 27, at 182, 250-51. 
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Firms operating in this intermediate stage, known as wholesalers, 
purchase goods directly from manufacturers and assemble them into 
complete product lines and distribute them to retailers. 
Despite claims that the Internet is fundamentally different from 
other media, the broadband industry mapped comfortably onto this 
three-stage vertical market structure.  The manufacturing stage 
encompasses those companies that generate the webpage content and 
Internet-based services that end users actually consume.  The wholesale 
stage is occupied by the ISPs and backbone providers, which aggregate 
content and applications.  Finally, last-mile providers deliver the content 
and service packages assembled by the ISPs to end customers. 
The proponents of multiple ISP access in essence are concerned that 
vertical integration between the retail and wholesale levels of this chain 
of distribution will allow network owners to use the leverage provided by 
their control of the retail stage to harm competition at the wholesale 
level.  In other words, they argue that allowing last-mile providers to 
deny unaffiliated ISPs access to their customers threatens ISP 
competition.70 
2. The ‘‘Layered’’ Approach Implicit in Connectivity 
Principles 
The connectivity principles implicitly rely on what has become 
known as the ‘‘layered model’’ to Internet regulation.71  This approach 
disaggregates networks into four horizontal layers that cut across 
different network providers.72  The bottommost layer is the physical  
 
 70. See, e.g., Hausman et al., supra note 7, at 158-65; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 5, at 
940-43; Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 5, at 664-70. 
 71. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Privacy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002); Richard Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating 
a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 
FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 624 (2004).  For other leading discussions analyzing the Internet 
through the layered model, see LESSIG, supra note 5, at 23-25; Yochai Benkler, From 
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Towards Sustainable 
Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000); Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. 
Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet 
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1189-92 (1999).  For a different vision of layered competition, 
see Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure 
of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT 
MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & 
Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999). 
 72. The layered model is related to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model 
developed by the International Standards Organization (ISO) in the 1980s, which divides 
seven different layers: application, presentation, session, transport, network, data link, and 
physical.  Some of these distinctions between those layers have greater relevance for 
technologists than for policy analysts.  See Werbach, supra note 71, at 59. 
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   FIGURE 3 
THE LAYERED MODEL OF BROADBAND ARCHITECTURE 
 
CONTENT LAYER 
(e.g., individual e-mail, webpages, voice calls, 
video programs) 
APPLICATIONS LAYER 
(e.g., web browsing, e-mail, Internet telephony, 
streaming media, database services) 
LOGICAL LAYER 
(e.g., TCP/IP, domain name system, telephone 
number system) 
PHYSICAL LAYER 
(e.g., telephone lines, coaxial cable, backbones, 
routers, servers) 
 
layer, which consists of the hardware infrastructure that actually carries 
the communications.  The second layer is the logical layer, which is 
composed of the protocols responsible for organizing the management 
and routing functions of the network.  The third layer is the applications 
layer, comprised of the particular programs and functions used by 
consumers.  The fourth layer is the content layer, which consists of the 
particular data being conveyed. 
The distinction between the layers can be illustrated in terms of the 
most common Internet application: e-mail.  Assuming that the particular 
e-mail in question is sent via DSL, the physical layer consists of the 
telephone lines, e-mail servers, routers, and backbone facilities needed to 
convey the e-mail from one location to another.  The logical layer 
consists of the SMTP protocol employed by the network to route the e-
mail to its destination.  The application layer consists of the e-mail 
program used, such as Microsoft Outlook.  The content layer consists of 
the particular e-mail message sent. 
The connectivity principles are motivated by a concern that last-
mile providers will use their control of the physical layer to reduce 
competition in the application and content layer by deviating from 
TCP/IP currently employed in the logical layer and replacing it with 
proprietary, noninteroperable protocols.  The connectivity principles are 
designed to forestall this dynamic by mandating that last-mile providers 
adhere to nonproprietary protocols and to open their networks to all 
applications and content on a nondiscriminatory basis.73 
 
 73. See also id. at 65-66 (arguing that the layered model requires that interfaces between 
each layer be kept open). 
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B. Market Structure and Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration has long been a source of economic 
controversy.74  Until the 1970s, competition policy generally viewed 
vertical integration with considerable hostility.  The emergence of the 
Chicago School of antitrust law and economics raised serious doubts 
regarding the preexisting orthodoxy, arguing that a monopolist would 
have little to gain by vertically integrating.  In addition, certain structural 
preconditions must be satisfied before vertical integration can harm 
competition.  Specifically, both the upstream and downstream markets 
that are being brought together through vertical integration must be 
concentrated and protected by barriers to entry.  If not, vertical 
integration should be permitted. 
These developments in turn prompted the emergence of a post-
Chicago School, which contradicted the Chicago School by identifying 
circumstances in which vertical integration can harm competition.  
While disagreeing over many key aspects of vertical integration theory, 
the post-Chicago School implicitly agreed that the same structural 
preconditions must be met before vertical integration can plausibly be 
problematic.75  The fact that these structural preconditions are enshrined 
in the Merger Guidelines promulgated by the Justice Department and 
the FTC demonstrates the broad acceptance that these principles now 
enjoy.76 
Applying these principles to the broadband industry strongly 
suggests that the FCC should not erect what would amount to a per se 
bar to vertical integration.  Considering first the requirement that the 
primary market be concentrated, the Merger Guidelines employs a 
measure of concentration known as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index 
(HHI) that has become the standard concentration under modern 
competition policy.  HHI is calculated by adding the square of the 
market share of each competitor.77  The result is a continuum that places 
 
 74. The discussion that follows is based on the more complete presentation at Yoo, supra 
note 27, at 253-68.  For a review of the historical development of vertical integration theory 
presented, see id. at 185-205. 
 75. Specifically, post-Chicago scholarship typically models the relevant markets either as 
dominant firm industries or as oligopolies engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition.  Both 
of these approaches require that the relevant markets be highly concentrated and protected by 
barriers to entry.  Yoo, supra note 27, at 203-05, 265-67. 
 76. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Non-
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §§ 4.131, 
4.212, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/2614.htm [hereinafter Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines] (requiring that the 
relevant markets be concentrated); id. §§ 4.132, 4.133, 4.21 (requiring that the relevant 
markets be protected by barriers to entry). 
 77. For example, a market of four firms with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%, 
respectively, would have an HHI of 302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600. 
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the level of concentration on a scale from 0 (in the case of complete 
market deconcentration) to 10,000 (in the case of monopoly).  The 
Guidelines indicate that the antitrust authorities are unlikely to challenge 
a vertical merger unless HHI in the primary market exceeds 1800, which 
is the level of concentration that would result in a market comprised of 
between five and six competitors of equal size.78 
Determining whether the market is concentrated depends on a 
proper market definition, which in turn requires the identification of the 
relevant product and geographic markets.79  Defining the relevant 
product market is relatively straightforward: empirical evidence indicates 
that broadband represents an independent product market that is distinct 
from narrowband services.80  Defining the relevant geographic market 
has proven more problematic.  Many analyses have mistakenly assumed 
that the relevant geographic market is the local market in which last-mile 
broadband providers meet end users.  Because these markets are typically 
dominated by two players--- the incumbent cable operators selling cable 
modem service and the incumbent local telephone company offering 
DSL service---defining the geographic market in this manner yields 
HHIs well in excess of 4000.81 
The problem with this analysis is that network neutrality proposals 
are designed to limit the exercise of market power not in the final 
downstream market in which last-mile providers meet end users, but 
rather in the upstream market in which last-mile providers meet ISPs 
and content/application providers.  The following thought experiment 
 
 78. Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 76, §§ 4.131, 213.  Note that the 
relevant threshold for vertical mergers is more lenient than the HHI thresholds applicable to 
horizontal mergers.  Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, markets with HHIs between 
1000 and 1800 are regarded as ‘‘moderately concentrated’’ and thus ‘‘potentially raise significant 
competitive concerns.’’  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51(b), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), revised, 4 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (Apr. 8, 1997), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html [hereinafter HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES].  Because vertical mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to 
harm competition, the Merger Guidelines apply a more lenient HHI threshold to vertical 
integration.  Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 76, § 4.0.  The Merger 
Guidelines also reserve the possibility of challenging a vertical merger at HHI levels below 
1800 if ‘‘effective collusion is particularly likely.’’  Id. § 4.213.  Such problems are more 
properly regarded as horizontal rather than vertical in nature. 
 79. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 78, §§ 1.0-1.3. 
 80. See Time Warner-AOL Merger, supra note 29, at 78-88 ¶¶ 69-73; Jerry A. 
Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential 
Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 303-04 (2001). 
 81. See Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 & 101 of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate 
the Provision of Fixed & Mobile Broadband Access, Educational & Other Advanced Servs. in 
the 2150-2162 & 2500-2690 Mhz Bands, Notice of Proposed Rule Making & Memorandum 
Opinion & Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 6722, 6774-75 ¶¶ 123-124 (2003); Hausman et al., supra 
note 7, at 155; Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 5, at 649. 
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confirms this insight: Suppose that every last-mile provider were required 
to sell their proprietary interests in ISPs, application providers, and 
content providers.  Such a change would not affect the economic 
relationship between end users and last-mile providers; end users seeking 
to purchase last-mile services would still face a de facto duopoly even if 
the broadband industry were completely vertically disintegrated.  
Compelled vertical disintegration would, however, substantially change 
the bargaining power between last-mile providers and ISPs and 
content/application providers. 
It is thus this upstream market in which last-mile providers meet 
ISPs and providers of Internet content and applications that represents 
the true target of network neutrality proposals.  This market is properly 
regarded as national in scope.82  Major web-based providers, such as 
Amazon.com or eBay, are focused more on the total customers they are 
able to reach nationwide than they are on their ability to reach customers 
located in any specific metropolitan area.  Their inability to reach certain 
customers is of no greater concern, however, than the inability of 
manufacturers of particular brands of cars, shoes, or other conventional 
goods to gain access to all parts of the country.  Being cut off from 
certain distribution channels should not cause economic problems, so 
long as those manufacturers are able to obtain access to a sufficient 
number of customers located elsewhere.  The proper question is thus not 
whether the broadband transport provider wields oligopoly power over 
broadband users in any particular city, but rather whether that provider 
has market power in the national market for obtaining broadband 
content. 
When the relevant inquiry is properly framed as the national 
market, it becomes clear that the market is too unconcentrated for 
vertical integration to pose a threat to competition.  The HHI is 1079, 
well below the 1800 threshold for vertical integration to be a source of 
economic concern.  In addition, the two largest broadband providers 
(Comcast and SBC) control only 21% and 14% of the national market 
respectively.  Absent collusion or some other impermissible horizontal 
practice (which would be a basis for sanction independent of concerns 
about vertical integration), the national broadband market is sufficiently 
unconcentrated to vitiate concerns about the vertical integration in the 
broadband industry. 
 In addition, the precondition that the secondary markets be 
concentrated and protected by entry barriers is also not met.83  As the 
FCC has recognized, the market for ISPs has long been quite   
 
 82. Yoo, supra note 27, at 253-54. 
 83. See id. at 259. 
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   FIGURE 4 
LAST-MILE BROADBAND SUBSCRIBERS AS OF YEAR END 2003 
 
Provider Technology Subscribers (000s) Share HHI 
     
Comcast cable modem  5,284  21%  442 
SBC DSL  3,516  14%  196 
Time Warner Cable cable modem  3,228  13%  165 
Verizon DSL  2,319  9%  85 
Cox cable modem  1,999  8%  63 
Charter cable modem  1,566  6%  39 
BellSouth DSL  1,462  6%  34 
Cablevision cable modem  1,057  4%  18 
Adelphia cable modem  960  4%  14 
Qwest DSL  637  3%  6 
Bright House cable modem  625  2%  6 
Covad DSL  517  2%  4 
Sprint DSL  304  1%  1 
Mediacom cable modem  280  1%  1 
Insight cable modem  230  1%  1 
RCN cable modem  200  1%  1 
Alltel DSL  153  1%  0 
Cable One cable modem  134  1%  0 
Cincinnati Bell DSL  99  0%  0 
Century Tel DSL  83  0%  0 
Other   503  2%  1 
     
Total   25,136 100% 1078 
Source: Fiber Faces the Inevitable Shakeout, DSL Competition, 
FIBER OPTICS NEWS, Mar. 17, 2004. 
competitive, and entry into ISP services has historically been quite easy.84  
Similarly, the markets for applications and content have long been the 
most competitive segments of the entire industry, marked by low levels 
of concentration and low barriers to entry.  The failure to satisfy these 
structural preconditions renders implausible any claims that vertical 
integration in the broadband industry constitutes a threat to competition. 
 
 84. TCI-AT&T Merger, supra note 28, at 3206 ¶ 93(1999). 
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IV. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF NETWORK DIVERSITY 
Conventional economic theory thus indicates that allowing last-mile 
providers to vertically integrate by entering into exclusivity arrangements 
with respect to certain content and applications providers or by requiring 
the use of proprietary ISPs is unlikely to harm competition.  In this 
section, I raise a number of points that have yet to appear in either the 
academic literature or in the filings in the ongoing broadband 
proceedings before the FCC.  These points show how allowing last-mile 
broadband providers to deviate from the principles of network neutrality 
can actually benefit consumers.85  Part A examines the economic 
efficiencies that can result from vertical integration.  Part B discusses 
how allowing network owners to deviate from complete interoperability 
can increase economic welfare by increasing the diversity of products 
available.  Conversely, imposing network neutrality as a regulatory matter 
may actually have the effect of reducing innovation and limiting 
consumer choice by skewing the Internet towards certain types of 
applications and away from others.  Part C analyzes the impact that 
connectivity principles can have on the concentration of last-mile 
technologies, which looms as a far more central threat to the competitive 
performance of the Internet than does the robustness of competition 
among content and applications providers.  It also details how 
standardizing network protocols can reinforce the supply-side and 
demand-side economies of scale that are the primary impetus towards 
concentration in last-mile services.  By forcing broadband providers to 
compete solely on price and network size, network neutrality reinforces 
the advantages already enjoyed by the largest players.  Conversely, 
allowing network heterogeneity can provide new last-mile platforms, 
such as 3G, with a strategy for survival. 
These arguments should not be misconstrued as favoring 
noninteroperability as a general matter.  On the contrary, I would expect 
most network owners to continue to adhere to a basic architecture based 
TCP/IP.  Maintaining interoperability provides consumers and network 
owners with such substantial financial advantages that most will adopt 
standardized protocols voluntarily.  In most cases, then, mandating 
network neutrality would be superfluous.  The only situations in which 
network neutrality has any purpose are those in which the market 
exhibits a preference for nonstandardization.  My concern is that 
compelling interoperability under those circumstances runs the risk of 
reducing economic welfare, either by preventing the realization of 
 
 85. The discussion that follows expands upon ideas I initially advanced in a brief 
editorial.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Fighting Traffic on the Disinformation Superhighway, 
NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, July 8, 2003, at 7. 
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efficiencies or by reinforcing the economies of scale that are the primary 
causes of potential market failure. 
A. Economic Efficiencies from Vertical Integration 
In addition to finding common ground on the structural 
preconditions necessary for vertical integration to harm competition, 
both Chicago and post-Chicago School theorists agree that vertical 
integration can yield substantial cost efficiencies.86  The potential for 
enhanced economic welfare from vertical integration is reflected in the 
Merger Guidelines, which explicitly recognize that the efficiencies 
created from vertical merger may outweigh the possibility of 
anticompetitive effects.87 
The broadband industry possesses many characteristics that make it 
likely that allowing a greater degree of vertical integration would yield 
substantial economic efficiencies.88  For example, the presence of large, 
up-front fixed costs leave both network owners and content/application 
providers vulnerable to a range of opportunistic behavior that vertical 
integration can substantially mitigate.  In addition, the fact that last-mile 
broadband providers must necessarily maintain a packet-switched 
network within their primary facilities to hold the data-based traffic after 
it has been separated from the other forms of communications89 makes it 
unsurprising that last-mile broadband providers find it more economical 
to provide ISP services themselves. 
The presence of such efficiencies is perhaps demonstrated most 
dramatically by the manner in which the multiple ISP access mandated 
during the AOL-Time Warner merger has been implemented.90  
Contrary to the original expectations of the FTC, the unaffiliated ISPs 
that have obtained access to AOL-Time Warner’s cable modem systems 
under the FTC’s merger clearance order have not placed their own 
packet network and backbone access facilities within AOL-Time 
Warner’s headends.  Instead, traffic bound for these unaffiliated ISPs 
 
 86. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 192-200 (reviewing efficiencies resulting from vertical 
integration identified by Chicago School commentators); id. at 204 (reviewing the 
acknowledgement by post-Chicago theorists that vertical integration can yield substantial 
efficiencies). 
 87. Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 76, §§ 4.135, 4.24.  In addition, the 
Guidelines give more weight to expected efficiencies in the case of vertical integration than 
with respect to a horizontal merger.  Id. § 4.24. 
 88. For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see Yoo, supra note 27, at 260-64.  
See also Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access 
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-105 (2004). 
 89. See supra Section I.B. 
 90. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1023 n.728. 
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exits the headend via AOL-Time Warner’s backbone and is handed off 
to the unaffiliated ISP at some external location.  It is hard to see how 
consumers benefit from such arrangements, given that they necessarily 
use the same equipment and thus provide the same speed, services, and 
access to content regardless of the identity of their nominal ISP.91  The 
fact that these unaffiliated ISPs have found it more economical to share 
AOL Time Warner’s existing ISP facilities rather than build their own 
strongly suggests that integrating ISP and last-mile operations does in 
fact yield real efficiencies. 
The absence of consumer benefits underscores the extent to which 
compelled access represents something of a competition policy 
anomaly.92  When confronted with an excessively concentrated market, 
competition policy’s traditional response is to deconcentrate the 
problematic market, either by breaking up the existing monopoly or by 
facilitating entry by a competitor.  Compelled access, in contrast, leaves 
the concentrated market intact and instead simply requires that the 
bottleneck resource be shared.  Such an approach may be justified if 
competition in the concentrated market is infeasible, as was generally 
believed to be the case with respect to local telephone service until 
recently.  Simply requiring that the monopoly be shared is inappropriate 
when competition from new entrants is technologically and economically 
achievable.93 
B. The Tradeoff Between Network Standardization and Product 
Variety 
The current debate has largely ignored how network neutrality can 
harm economic welfare by limiting the variety of products.  The 
predominance of price theory, in which the sole source of economic 
welfare is the difference between reservation prices and the actual prices 
charged, has caused commentators studying the economics of broadband 
networks to overlook the potential benefits associated with product 
 
 91. See COLUMBIA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS OF OPEN ACCESS AND CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS 22-23 (Dec. 2001), 
available at http:// archive.aclu.org/issues/cyber/broadband_report.pdf. 
 92. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 268-69; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1020. 
 93. The feasibility of platform competition underscores the problems with viewing 
previous efforts to standardize and compel access to the local telephone service as precedent for 
imposing network neutrality on the Internet.  See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 147-51; Lemley & 
Lessig, supra note 5, at 934-36, 938.  Most steps to mandate access to local telephone 
networks were justified by the fact that competition in local telephony was believed impossible 
at the time.  Such arguments do not apply to broadband, in which platform competition has 
emerged as a real possibility. 
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differentiation.94  Simply put, allowing network owners to employ 
different protocols can foster innovation by allowing a wider range of 
network products to exist.  Conversely, compulsory standardization can 
reduce consumer surplus by limiting the variety of products available.95 
Viewed from this perspective, the pressure towards proprietary 
standards may not represent some sinister attempt by last-mile providers 
to harm competition.  Instead, it may represent nothing more than the 
natural outgrowth of the underlying heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences.  In the words of two leading commentators on network 
economics, ‘‘market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products 
reflects the social value of variety.’’96  It is for this reason that economic 
theorists have uniformly rejected calls for blanket prohibitions of 
exclusivity arrangements and other means for differentiating network 
services.97  Indeed, some models indicate that the deployment of 
proprietary network standards may actually prove more effective in 
promoting innovation and the adoption of socially optimal 
technologies.98 
The current forces that are motivating network providers to 
consider introducing increasing levels of intelligence into their core 
networks provide an apt illustration of this dynamic.  As discussed 
 
 94. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 NYU L. REV. 
212, 236-46 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation] (reviewing the 
literature on product differentiation); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to 
Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1602-18 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rethinking 
Free, Local Television] (applying product differentiation theory to electronic 
communications). 
 95. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network 
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 110 (1994) (noting that ‘‘the primary cost of standardization is 
loss of variety: consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from’’); Farrell & Saloner, 
supra note 7, at 71 (counting ‘‘reduction in variety’’ as one of the ‘‘important social costs’’ of 
standardization). 
 96. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 95, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986)); see also S. J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 (1996) (‘‘Where there are differences in preference regarding 
alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely outcome.’’); James B. Speta, A Vision 
of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 1569 (2002) (‘‘If there 
were competition among broadband platforms, companies would pursue different strategies to 
differentiate themselves . . . .’’). 
 97. See, e.g., David Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antirust Analysis to Promote 
Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); David S. Evans & Richard 
Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36 (1996); 
Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 678 (1999). 
 98. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network 
Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55, 73 (1992); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825, 
838-39 (1986). 
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earlier,99 consumer demand for more time-sensitive applications, such as 
Internet telephony and streaming media, may be providing much of the 
impetus away from standardization.  Forbidding network owners to 
introduce routers that can assign different priority levels to packets based 
on the nature of the application would have the effect of precluding 
consumers from enjoying the benefits of certain types of applications.100  
The current ubiquity of TCP/IP makes it seem like an appropriate 
default rule and appears to justify placing the burden on those who would 
deviate from it.  A moment’s reflection makes clear how adherence to the 
Internet’s nonproprietary structure may actually impede innovation. 
There is considerable irony in the network neutrality proponents’ 
insistence that allowing Internet providers to introduce intelligence into 
their core networks would skew innovation and that technological 
humility demands adherence to an end-to-end architecture.  The 
decision to concentrate intelligence at the edges of the network and to 
require packet nondiscrimination would itself skew the market towards 
certain applications and away from others.  The choice is thus not 
between neutrality and nonneutrality in the overall direction of 
innovation.  Mandating either would have the inevitable effect of 
determining technological winners and losers.  My point is not that 
policy makers should reverse the presumption and erect a preference for 
innovation in the network’s core over innovation at the network’s edge.  
The better course is to favor neither and to allow consumer preferences 
to dictate the eventual outcome. 
Some of the more thoughtful network neutrality proponents 
concede that consumers may well benefit from allowing broadband 
network owners to deploy proprietary protocols and that it can be 
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish whether procompetitive or 
anticompetitive motivations prompted a particular network owner’s 
conduct.101  In light of the ambiguity regarding the economic impact of 
any particular use of proprietary protocols, it is somewhat surprising that 
network neutrality proponents nonetheless turn to government-
mandated uniformity as their preferred regulatory response.  The 
difficulties in distinguishing legitimate business practices from those 
motivated by a desire to harm competition would appear to favor the 
adoption of a contextual, case-by-case methodology over the use of 
categorical regulatory mandates.102  Moreover, the position advanced by 
 
 99. See supra Section I.B. 
 100. See Speta, supra note 96, at 1574. 
  101. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 46-47, 167-76; Cooper, supra note 5, at 1050-52; Wu, 
supra note 5, at 148. 
 102. For a related proposal, see Weiser, supra note 24, at 48-57 (advocating a case-by-case 
regulatory approach that erects a presumption against discriminatory access, but allows the 
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network neutrality proponents implicitly assumes that the government is 
in a better position to evaluate the competitive impact of particular 
practices than are private individuals and that the benefits of 
governmental intervention will outweigh the inevitable costs imposed by 
a regulatory lag.103  That network neutrality advocates would embrace 
such a position is rendered all the more puzzling by the fact that it 
contradicts the decentralized, nonhierarchical spirit that they claim has 
animated the Internet since its inception.104 
C. Network Neutrality and Competition in the Last Mile 
On a more fundamental level, network neutrality advocates’ focus 
on innovation in content and applications may be misplaced.  
Application of the basic insights of vertical integration theory reveals that 
markets will achieve economic efficiency only if each stage of production 
is competitive.105  In other words, any vertical chain of production will 
only be as efficient as its most concentrated link.  The central focus of 
broadband policy should be on how best to foster competition in the last 
mile.  The intuition underlying this insight can be easily discerned by 
returning to the thought experiment in which we supposed that 
regulators required complete vertical disintegration of the broadband 
industry.  As noted earlier, the fundamental economic problems 
stemming from the paucity of last-mile options would persist until new 
entrants appear. 
Viewing the issues in this manner reveals how the major network 
neutrality proposals are focusing on the wrong policy problem.  By 
directing their efforts towards encouraging and preserving competition 
among ISPs and content/application providers, they concentrate their 
attention on the segments of the industry that are already the most 
competitive and the least protected by entry barriers.106  Restated in 
terms of the ‘‘layered model’’ of the broadband industry, the major 
network neutrality proposals advocate regulating the logical layer in a 
 
network owner to offer legitimate business reasons to justify the practice). 
 103. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 581 (2003). 
 104. See Lessig, supra note 5, at 37, 40, 44.  I must confess to being somewhat skeptical of 
the historical claim that the essence of the Internet has been its freedom from centralized 
control.  The supposedly libertarian Internet of 1995 was largely the product of direct 
governmental support provided by DARPA and the National Science Foundation.  
Conversely, the supposedly sinister forces pushing the Internet away from its interoperable 
structure are actually the result of the shift to private ordering.  It would thus be quite ironic to 
support governmental intervention as a means for promoting decentralization and the lack of 
hierarchy. 
 105. Yoo, supra note 27, at 241-42. 
 106. See TCI-AT&T Merger, supra note 28, at 3206 ¶ 93 (noting the high level of 
competition among ISPs). 
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way that best promotes competition in the application and content 
layers.107  Broadband policy would be better served if such efforts were 
directed towards identifying and increasing the competitiveness of the 
most concentrated level of production.  In other words, the logical layer 
should be regulated in the way that best promotes investment and the 
emergence of competition in the alternative physical network capacity, 
since it is the physical layer that is currently the most concentrated. 
The lack of competition in the last mile has traditionally been 
attributed to both supply-side and demand-side considerations.  The 
supply-side consideration is the fact that building the physical network of 
wires needed to provide DSL and cable modem service requires incurring 
substantial sunk costs.  The presence of high sunk costs gives rise to a 
tendency towards natural monopoly conditions.  The demand side 
consideration focuses on economic effects, which exist when the value of 
a network is determined by the number of other people connected to that 
network.  The more people that are part of the network, the more 
valuable the network becomes.  This dynamic can in turn create 
considerable demand-side economies of scale that reinforce the tendency 
towards concentration. 
What has been largely overlooked in the current debates is how 
allowing networks to differentiate in the services they offer can mitigate 
the forces that are driving the broadband industry towards concentration.  
Conversely, measures that limit networks’ ability to differentiate their 
services can exacerbate the already extant tendencies towards oligopoly in 
the last mile.  There is thus a real possibility that imposing network 
neutrality may actually worsen, rather than alleviate, the central policy 
problem confronting the broadband industry. 
1. Declining Average Costs and Supply-Side Economies of 
Scale 
The supply-side considerations that cause last-mile services to 
exhibit a tendency towards natural monopoly can most easily be 
understood by focusing on the shape of the average cost curve.108  If the 
 
 107. See, e.g., Ex parte Letter of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig, supra note 40, at 2-
9; Werbach, supra note 71, at 65-66. 
 108. A more complete analysis of natural monopoly would require additional refinements.  
For example, a market may exhibit a tendency towards a natural monopoly even when average 
costs are increasing so long as the industry costs are subadditive, which occurs when one firm 
could produce the industry’s entire output more cheaply than could two firms.  WILLIAM J. 
BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY 
STRUCTURE 16-24 (rev. ed. 1988).  That said, declining average costs are sufficient to give 
rise to natural monopoly.  Id. at 176.  See generally Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Television, 
supra note 94, at 1596-1600 (discussing the determinants of declining average cost and their 
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average cost curve is decreasing, firms with the largest volumes can 
provide services the most cheaply, which in turn allows them to undercut 
their smaller competitors.  This price advantage allows the largest players 
to capture increasingly large shares of the market, which reinforces their 
pricing advantage still further.  Eventually the largest firm will gain a 
sufficient cost advantage to drive all of its competitors out of the market. 
Whether average cost is increasing or decreasing is determined by 
the magnitude of the sunk costs.  On the one hand, the ability to spread 
sunk costs over increasingly large volumes places downward pressure on 
average cost.  For example, spreading a $100 million sunk-cost 
investment across one million customers would require allocating an 
average of $100 in sunk costs to each customer.  If the same sunk-cost 
investment were spread over ten million customers, each consumer would 
have to pay only an average of $10 in order to cover sunk costs.  The 
larger the sunk costs relative to the overall demand, the more pronounced 
these scale economies will be, although the marginal impact of this effect 
will decay exponentially as production increases.  At the same time, the 
scarcity of factors of production and the principle of diminishing 
marginal returns tend to cause average costs to increase as volume 
increases. 
Whether average cost is rising or falling at any particular point is 
determined by which of these two effects dominates the other.  When 
the sunk-cost investments needed to establish the network are large, the 
former effect tends to loom as the more important and cause average cost 
to decline.  Because entry by new broadband networks tends to require 
large sunk-cost investments, the market for last-mile providers is 
generally expected to exhibit a natural tendency towards concentration. 
What network neutrality advocates have failed to recognize is how 
allowing last-mile broadband providers to differentiate their product 
offerings can help prevent declining-cost industries from devolving into 
natural monopolies.109  It is not unusual for small-volume producers to 
survive against their larger rivals even in the face of unexhausted 
economies of scale by targeting those customers who place the highest 
 
relationship to natural monopoly); Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 94, 
at 226-28 (same). 
 109. The seminal analysis of how competition among differentiated products can yield an 
equilibrium in which multiple declining-cost firms can coexist is EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, 
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956).  For more complete 
analysis of how product differentiation can mitigate the problems caused by declining average 
costs, see Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, supra note 94, at 248-49.  For a brief 
statement of how nonstandardization can facilitate competition among telecommunications 
networks, see Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in 
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1251 (1999).  For a discussion applying a similar analysis to another type of electronic 
communications, see Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Television, supra note 94, at 1603 & n.61. 
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value on the particular types of products or services they offer, as 
demonstrated by the survival of specialty stores in a world increasingly 
dominated by larger and more efficient stores offering one-stop 
shopping.  It is true that consumers of these small-volume producers will 
pay more for these specialized products.  That said, it is difficult to see 
how these consumers are worse off.  The value that they derive from the 
specialized product necessarily exceeds the amount they must pay for it, 
otherwise they simply would not agree to the transaction.  Indeed, if 
consumers were unable to use higher prices to signal the intensity of their 
preferences, the low-volume version would not exist at all. 
Last-mile providers have a number of avenues open to them for 
differentiating the networks.  One way is by entering into exclusivity 
arrangements with respect to content, as demonstrated by the role played 
by such arrangements in helping direct broadcast satellite (DBS) provider 
DirecTV emerge as a viable alterative to cable television.  For example, 
DirecTV is offering an exclusive programming package known as ‘‘NFL 
Sunday Ticket’’ that allows sports fans to watch the entire NFL schedule 
and not just the games being shown by CBS and Fox in their service 
area.  Many cable customers have been frustrated by their inability to 
purchase NFL Sunday Ticket through their local cable operators.  If 
regulators viewed exclusivity arrangement solely in static terms, they 
might be tempted to increase consumer choice by requiring this 
programming package also be made available to cable subscribers.  The 
impolicy of such a reaction becomes manifest when one recalls that the 
central problem confronting the television industry is the local cable 
operators’ historic dominance over multichannel video distribution.  The 
market reaction has already demonstrated how exclusive programming 
like NFL Sunday Ticket is serving as a major driver towards the 
deployment of DBS as an alternative outlet for distributing television 
programming.  Conversely, requiring that such programming be made 
available to cable as well as DBS customers would run the risk of further 
entrenching the local cable operator by eliminating one of the primary 
inducements to shift from cable to DBS. 
Another way that last-mile providers can differentiate the services 
they provide is by optimizing the architecture of their networks for 
different types of applications.  To offer an illustration in the context of 
broadband, it is theoretically possible that multiple broadband networks 
could co-exist notwithstanding the presence of unexhausted economies 
of scale.  The first network could be optimized for conventional Internet 
applications, such as e-mail and website access.  The second network 
could incorporate security features designed to appeal to users focused on 
e-commerce.  The third network could employ policy-based routers that 
prioritize packets in the manner that allows for more effective provision 
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of time-sensitive applications such as Internet telephony.  Other 
networks could be designed to optimize the provision of still other 
services.  If this were to occur, the network with the largest number of 
customers need not enjoy a decisive price advantage.  Instead, each could 
survive by targeting and satisfying those consumers who place the highest 
value on the types of service they offer. 
This example illustrates how imposing network neutrality could 
actually frustrate the emergence of platform competition in the last mile.  
Put another way, protocol standardization tends to commodify network 
services.  By focusing competition solely on price, it tends to accentuate 
the pricing advantages created by declining average costs, which in turn 
reinforces the market’s tendency towards concentration.  Conversely, 
increasing the dimensions along which networks can compete by 
allowing them to deploy a broader range of architectures may make it 
easier for multiple last-mile providers to co-exist.110 
2. Network Externalities and Demand-Side Economies of 
Scale 
Other commentators have argued that network neutrality must be 
mandated as a regulatory matter in order to redress the competitive 
problems posed by network economic effects.111  For reasons that I have 
discussed in detail elsewhere,112 such claims are subject to a number of 
important analytical limitations and qualifications.  A few brief 
comments on two of the more salient limitations will suffice to make my 
point. 
First, for reasons analogous to the similar requirement with respect 
to vertical integration, the existing theories require that the network 
owner have a dominant market position before network economic effects 
can even plausibly harm competition.113  The classic illustration of this 
 
 110. By emphasizing the promotion of platform competition, my argument bears some 
resemblance to the proposal advanced by Philip Weiser.  See Weiser, supra note 103, at 583-
91.  Our analyses differ in that Professor Weiser focuses his attention on the application and 
logical layers of the Internet, see id. at 542, whereas I am primarily concerned with 
competition in the physical layer.  We also differ in our preferred policy response to a 
dominant player.  Professor Weiser would support allowing others to have access to a 
proprietary protocol if the protocol owner achieves or is headed towards a dominant position.  
Id. at 591-94.  I would attempt to dispel dominance not by direct regulation, but rather by 
attempting to facilitate entry by new broadband platforms and allowing the ensuing 
competition to dissipate any problems.  Thus, my analysis favors allowing the use of 
proprietary protocols even when one firm is dominant.  It also has the advantage of charging 
regulators with tasks for which they are better suited and establishing a regime that envisions 
an end to governmental intervention. 
 111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 278-82; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 924-33. 
 113. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 923, 926. 
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phenomenon is the development of competition in local telephony 
during the 1890s made possible by the expiration of the initial telephone 
patents.  After the Bell System’s market share was cut in half, it 
attempted to employ network economic effects to reverse its losses.  
Specifically, it refused to interconnect with these upstarts, hoping that its 
greater network size would make it sufficiently more attractive to 
consumers to give it a decisive advantage.  This effort ultimately failed, 
however, since the independent companies that comprised the other half 
of the industry were able to forestall any negative network economic 
effects by allying with one another to form a network that was similar in 
size to the Bell network.114  In the end, it was control of certain patents 
critical to providing high-quality long distance service and not network 
economic effects that allowed the Bell System to return to dominance.  
The clear implication is that the presence of a single competitor of 
roughly the same size as the network owner is likely sufficient to 
eliminate any such problems. 
Second, the argument that network economic effects create 
externalities that lead to market failure is wholly inapplicable in the 
context of telecommunications networks.115  This is because any 
externalities that may exist will necessarily occur within a physical 
network that can be owned.116  Thus, although individual users may not 
be in a position to capture all of the benefits created by their demand for 
network services, the network owner will almost certainly be in a position 
to do so.  Any benefits created by network participation can thus be 
internalized and allocated through the interaction between the network 
owner and network users.117 
The commentary on network economic effects thus does not 
support the contention that imposing network neutrality is necessary to 
protect competition.  Quite the contrary, the literature indicates that 
compelling interoperability could affirmatively harm competition.  This 
is because allowing last-mile providers to differentiate their networks can 
mitigate the problems resulting from any demand-side economies of 
scale created by network economic effects that may exist.  Simply put, 
allowing networks to tailor their services to the needs of different groups 
 
 114. See Roger Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United 
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 291-92 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & 
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
 115. The discussion that follows is based on Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 926-27. 
 116. The literature refers to network externalities that occur in the context of a physical 
network as ‘‘direct network externalities.’’  Katz & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 424. 
 117. See S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source 
of Market Failure?, 17 RES. LAW & ECON. 1, 11-13 (1995); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 137, 141-
44 (1994). 
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of customers can offset the economic advantages enjoyed by larger 
networks in much the same manner as differentiation can offset the 
supply-side economies of scale.  Targeting those customers who value the 
differentiated services makes it possible for smaller networks to survive 
despite the greater inherent appeal of larger networks.118 
Conversely, mandating that all broadband networks employ 
nonproprietary protocols can foreclose network owners from using 
differentiation to mitigate the pressures towards concentration.  
Preventing network owners from varying the services that they offer 
forces networks to compete solely on price and network size, further 
reinforcing and accentuating the benefits already enjoyed by the largest 
players.  As a result, network neutrality runs the danger of becoming the 
source of, rather than the solution to, market failure, thus allowing less 
innovation and fewer participants. 
V. THE ROLE OF REGULATION 
It is thus clear that permitting last-mile providers to deviate from 
the universal interoperability envisioned by the proponents of network 
neutrality may actually yield substantial economic benefits.  Not only 
does differentiation potentially put networks in a better position to satisfy 
any underlying heterogeneity in consumer preferences; it also has the 
potential to alleviate the supply-side and demand-side economies of scale 
that are the sources of market failure that justify regulatory intervention 
in the first place. 
The case against network neutrality is further bolstered by the risk 
that regulation might itself induce market failure by causing the existing 
oligopoly in last-mile technologies to persist long after technological 
improvements have made real competition possible.  If access to a 
bottleneck network were not compelled, those who did not want to pay 
supracompetitive prices for network services would have the incentive to 
invest in alternative network capacity.  Compelling access, on the other 
hand, would rescue those who would otherwise be financing the buildout 
of other last-mile technologies from having to undertake those 
investments.  Network neutrality may thus have the effect of depriving 
alterative broadband platforms of their natural strategic partners and of 
starving them of the resources they need to build out their networks.  
Although such a policy might have been reasonable during previous eras, 
when the fact that construction of new network platforms was unfeasible 
rendered such considerations immaterial, it is unjustifiable in the current 
 
 118. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 96; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 95, at 106; 
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 96, at 292.  For a related argument, see Weiser, supra note 
103, at 587-89. 
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environment, in which competition from alternative network platforms is 
a real option. 
The task confronting policy makers is made all the more difficult by 
the fact that making any difference would require policy makers to 
intervene at a fairly early stage in the technology’s development, since 
governmental intervention after the market has settled on the optimal 
technology would serve little purpose.119  Although whether regulation or 
private ordering would provide the better means for determining the 
optimal technology is ultimately an empirical question, there are a 
number of examples that suggest that public policy would be better 
served by relying on the latter.  For example, during its early years the 
electric power industry went through an extended period of competition 
between standards based on direct current (DC) and alternating current 
(AC) that enhanced competition and promoted innovation in electrical 
appliances.120  Even now, the electrical power network is diverse enough 
to accommodate appliances designed to run on the predominant 110-volt 
standard as well as larger appliances requiring 220 volts.  Another 
example, drawn this time from the telecommunications industry, is the 
competition between time division multiple access (TDMA) and code 
division multiple access (CDMA) standards for mobile telephony.  
Rather than imposing a particular technological vision, the government 
has allowed these standards to compete in the marketplace. 
In addition, governmental processes are subject to a number of well-
recognized biases.  Regulatory decisions are all too often shaped by 
political goals that are not always consistent with good policy.121  In 
addition, policymakers may also find it tempting to give too little weight 
to the future benefits associated with the entry of alternative network 
capacity, which will no doubt seem uncertain and contingent, and to 
overvalue the more immediate and concrete benefits of providing 
consumers with more choices in the here and now.  Indeed, the FCC has 
allowed short-term considerations to override longer-term benefits in the 
past.122  Public choice theory strongly suggests that the bias in favor of 
 
 119. Bresnahan, supra note 71, at 200-03. 
 120. BRUCE M. OWEN & GREGORY L. ROSSTON, LOCAL BROADBAND ACCESS: 
PRIMUM NON NOCERE OR PRIMUM PROCESSI?  A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 11-12 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Related Publication No. 03-19, Aug. 
2003), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=285 (citing 
Paul A. David & Julie Ann Bunn, Gateway Technologies and the Evolutionary Dynamics of 
Network Industries: Lessons from Electricity Supply History, in EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY 
AND MARKET STRUCTURE 121 (Arnold Heertje & Mark Perlman eds., 1990)).  There is 
thus some irony in the fact that some network neutrality proponents point to the example of 
electric power as supporting the need for early governmental intervention.  See Ex parte Letter 
of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig, supra note 40, at 3; Wu, supra note 71, at 1165. 
 121. See Bresnahan, supra note 71, at 202-03. 
 122. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach 
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the former over the latter is no accident.123 
There thus appears to be considerable danger that compelling access 
will forestall the buildout of 3G, fixed wireless, and other alternative 
broadband platforms.124  I acknowledge the possibility that last-mile 
broadband providers may be able to use the market power provided by 
the degree of concentration in local markets to harm competition.  For 
example, it is conceivable that cable operators might prohibit cable 
modem customers from streaming video in order to protect their market 
position in the market for conventional television.  At the same time, 
such a prohibition might also represent an understandable attempt to 
prevent high-volume users from imposing congestion costs on other 
users.125  Even network neutrality proponents acknowledge how difficult 
it can be to determine which is the case.126 
In effect, policymakers are presented with a choice between two 
possible responses.  On the one hand, they can trust their ability to 
distinguish between these two different situations and limit network 
neutrality to those in which deviations from full interoperability are 
motivated by anticompetitive considerations.  The costs of doing so 
include the danger that regulators might err in making this 
determination as well as the risk that compelling access might delay entry 
by alternative last-mile technologies.  On the other hand, regulators can 
adopt a more humble posture about their ability to distinguish 
anticompetitive from procompetitive behavior and attempt to resolve the 
problem by promoting entry by alternative broadband platforms.  Once a 
sufficient number of alternative last-mile providers exist, the danger of 
anticompetitive effects disappears, as any attempt to use an exclusivity 
arrangement to harm competition will simply induce consumers to 
obtain their services from another last-mile provider.  In this case, the 
 
to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 272-75 (2003). 
 123. There are also practical reasons to question the efficacy of access as a remedy.  
Network owners can be expected not to cooperate with those seeking access by charging the 
highest prices possible and by imposing restrictive nonprice terms and conditions.  As a result, 
the FCC is likely to find itself embroiled in having to police all aspects of the parties’ business 
relationship.  This has led some scholars that suggest that attempts to mandate are likely to 
prove futile.  See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in 
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 
(1999).  Indeed, the FCC’s experience in implementing the UNE access requirements of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 appears to confirm this suspicion.  See also Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing difficulties in 
implementing leased access to cable systems). 
 124. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 268-69; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1020; see also 
Glenn A. Woroch, Open Access Rules and the Broadband Race, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. 
DET. C.L. 719 (presenting a formal economic model of this effect). 
 125. See James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
975, 1004-07 (2000). 
 126. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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primary costs stem from delay.  Because entry by new network platforms 
will not be instantaneous, there will necessarily be a period of time 
during which consumers may remain vulnerable to anticompetitive 
behavior.127 
Choosing between these two approaches depends upon weighing 
their relative merits, with the understanding that each represents a 
second-best alternative.  Although a formal analysis of the tradeoff 
exceeds the scope of my comments, my instinct is to favor the latter.  It is 
motivated in part by my belief that regulatory authorities will be more 
effective at pursuing the goal of stimulating entry by new network 
platforms than they would be in ascertaining whether a particular 
exclusivity arrangement would promote or hinder competition.  In 
addition, because the long-term benefits will be compounded over an 
indefinite period of time, they should dominate whatever short-run static 
inefficiency losses that may exist.128  Perhaps most importantly, 
promoting entry has embedded within it a built-in exit strategy.  Once a 
sufficient number of broadband network platforms exist, regulatory 
intervention will no longer be necessary.  This stands in stark contrast 
with access-oriented solutions, which implicitly assume that regulation 
will continue indefinitely. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim that guaranteeing interoperability and nondiscrimination 
would benefit consumers has undisputed intuitive appeal.  The fact that 
interoperability and neutrality have represented the historical norm 
makes it seem appropriate to put the burden of persuasion on those who 
would move away from that architecture. 
A close examination of the economic tradeoffs underlying network 
neutrality reveals a number of countervailing considerations that may not 
be readily apparent at first blush.  Not only does network neutrality risk 
reducing consumer choice in content and applications; it raises the even 
more significant danger of stifling competition in the last-mile by 
forestalling the emergence of new broadband technologies.  Although 
such an admonition would be well taken under any circumstances, it 
carries particular force in industries like broadband that are undergoing 
rapid technological change. 
 
 127. See Weiser, supra note 103, at 561; Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 
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 128. See Janusz Ordover & William Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology 
Industries, 4 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 13, 32 (1988); David J. Brennan, Fair Price and 
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347, 355 (2002). 
